There is nothing novel in Professor Berger's charge that the Supreme Court has twisted and ignored the intent of the framers of the Constitution by exercising an "amending power" under the "guise of interpretation."1 Berger, however, has thoroughly examined primary historical sources and effectively marshalled the evidence in favor of the theory that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to have a very narrow effect. His style is readable and avoids legalistic jargon. Further, Berger is known for his consistent rejection of an expansive interpretation of the Constitution even when he would approve of the result.
Professor Berger correctly distinguishes between the historical question of what was the framers' intent and the issue of whether the original intention of the framers is binding on the present generation. 4 The majority of the book is devoted to historical expositions of the intent of the original framers of the Constitution and the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. This book review will examine the validity of Berger's crucial argument that, according to traditional canons of interpretation, the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution is "as good as written into the text" and that any interpretation contrary to their intent is not valid.
5
Berger argues that interpretation according to the framers' intent is a "long-standing rule of interpretation in the construction of all documentswills, contracts, statutes-and although today such rules are downgraded as 'mechanical' aids, they played a vastly more important role for the Founders."6 He attacks the misuse of Marshall's famous dictum that "[w]e must * B.A., University of Kansas; J.D., DePaul University. 2. See Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 642 (1942). 3. This book is not tainted by racial prejudice. Professor Berger says in his introduction that " [m] y study may be absolved of that imputation: I regard segregation as a blot on our society .... " His attempt at self-defense is understandable, but his citation for this statement reads in full: "One reads with horror of the Negro lynchings and torture that found their way into the courts as late as 1938. P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969, at 95, 123 (1972) ." The citation proves nothing; it is an example of Berger's use of citations per se to support his text. BERGER, supra note 1, at 4 n.12.
never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding .. .a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
7 Even if Berger is correct, it does not excuse his failure to discuss the validity of Marshall's distinction. Also there are obvious fundamental differences between wills, deeds, contracts, and statutes, on the one hand, and the constitution of a nation-state on the other. Further, the traditional canons for written document interpretation were established before the existence of written constitutions; therefore, the application of these canons to the United States Constitution is by analogy rather than by contemporaneous authority. Berger does not acknowledge that the application is by analogy; thus, at no point is the appropriateness of the analogy examined.
A more important issue is whether Berger is correct in asserting that the traditional canons of written document interpretation consist essentially of a search for the intention of the framer. Although this is the orthodox modern view, 8 it does not follow that this view was predominant when the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment were adopted. Berger cannot prove this assertion by citing post-Constitution cases to the effect that "[t]he intention of the lawmaker is the law," 9 nor by citing the eighteenth century English rule to the same effect.
10
The rule that the lawmaker's intent is the law must be read in light of the prevailing legal fiction that words possess fixed and unalterable meanings." This concept was a carry-over from the medieval belief that the inherent potency of words was "no mere fairy tale, but a reality of life." 12 With the intellectual development of the Renaissance and Enlightenment the view lost general currency, but it remained as a legal fiction for reasons peculiar to the English judicial system.
13
In the early nineteenth century the fixed meaning rule gave way not to the modern search for subjective intent but to the rule that plain meaning 7. In brief, Berger argues that this portion of McCulloch was merely dicta, that it did not concern an extention of powers but rather the proper means of carrying out expressly granted powers. In addition, Marshall, writting under a pseudonym, denied that the opinion claimed any right to change the Constitution. 9. BERGER, supra note 1, at 7-8 n.24.
10. Id. at 7-8 n.24, 366. 11. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461 (3d ed. 1940). 12. Id. 13. Id. For example, there was a prejudice in favor of the legal heirs. This prejudice is not suprising since land was not devisable until 1540. By refusing to acknowledge the testator's intention the older system of land inheritance would be promoted. If an heir was not mentioned in a will, no parol evidence, however convincing and reliable, would be admitted to show that the omission was intentional. Therefore the heir would receive his share as if there had been no will. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461 (3d ed. 1940).
There was also a prejudice against allowing juries to interpret written documents, especially deeds. The legal fiction that written words had only one meaning protected documents from an uncertain fate at the hands of jurors. Id.
[Vol. 28:559 cannot be disturbed. The meaning of words was still fixed by rules of law unless a contradictory meaning was clear from the face of the document. 14 Interpretation of statutes was more complex, since the courts could not dismiss the will of Parliament. Blackstone stated the rule as follows:
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legistator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law.
15
In other words the will of the lawmaker is to be found in signs or outward manifestations of intent. This is an explicit rejection of the interpretation of statutes according to the true, subjective intent of the framers.
Berger states that the legislative history of a statute, including committee reports, is "commonly regarded as the best evidence of legislative 'intention.' "16 The merits of this approach are debatable, but it is the prevailing American practice. Justice Frankfurter once remarked that "only when the legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute." 17 The traditional English rule is just the opposite. Not only is legislative history inadmissible as evidence, but neither court nor counsel can refer to it.
18
Even if the rule that "the will of the lawmaker is the law" is taken at face value, it does not follow that the intent of the framers is "as good as written into the Constitution." Members of the Constitutional Convention were not the lawmakers since they did not accept and ratify the Constitution. This is equally true for members of the Thirty-ninth Congress who did not accept and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Berger, in addressing the importance of "original intention," 19 twice quotes Madison as saying that if "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation ...be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable [government] In explaining the reasons for these rules, Hamilton, in a letter dated September 11, 1792, under the pseudonym "Amicus," stated:
Had the deliberations been open while going on, the clamors of faction would have prevented any satisfactory result; had they been afterwards disclosed, much food would have been afforded to inflammatory declamation. Propositions made without due reflection, and perhaps abandoned by the proposers themselves on more mature reflection, would have been handles for a profusion of ill-natured accusation. Every infallible declaimer, taking his own ideas as the perfect standard, would have railed without measure or mercy at every member of the Convention who had gone a single line beyond his standard. 136-37 (1937) .
C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
It is worth noting that these secrecy rules were respected until well after the ratification of the Constitution, even by Convention delegates who opposed adoption and later led the fight against ratification. C. ROsSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 283 (1966) . The purpose and effect of the rules was clarified in a letter written by Edmund Carrington, a member of Congress from Virginia, to Madison, dated June 13, 1787, stating: "Having matured your opinions and given them a collective form, they will be fairly presented to the public and stand their own advocates.
... C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1937) . This objective was not the author's afterthought because it clearly appears in the record at the very beginning of the Convention:
Mr. King objected to one of the rules in the Report authorising any member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes. He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the Constituents it was unnecessary to would be used by some convention delegates to support their interpretations of the Constitution. Such use of the record was made in connection with the ratification of Jay's Treaty in 1796.26 The secrecy and the reaction to its breach convince this author that the interpretation of the Constitution according to the intent of the framers is contrary to the intent of the framers. This is the legal process: the interpretation of the Constitution in the context of a particular case and controversy. It is this reasoned decision-making which gives meaning to all law, including the words "life," "liberty," "property," and "due process of law," found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Berger argues that these were well developed concepts and "words of received meaning." 27 This is correct, but only in the sense that it is not permissible to define them innovatively, without regard for their developed meanings. While the original source of the words is the Magna Carta, 2 8 it is exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions. Col. Mason seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting.
The proposed rule was rejected nem. contradicente. On April 6, 1796, in the House of Representatives, Madison rose to protest: But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who formed our Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution. Id. at 374. Madison used harsher language in a letter sent to Jefferson two days before addressing the House:
According to my memory & that of others, the Journal of the Convention was, by a vote deposited with the P., to be kept sacred until called for by some competent authority. How can this be reconciled with the use he has made of it? Id. at 372.
27. BERGER, supra note 1, at 35. obvious that the connotation of these words has been greatly expanded since the framing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Berger incorrectly asserts that "[tihey had been crystallized by Blackstone .... "29 The legal process did not grind to a halt with the publication of Blackstone's Commentaries. This growth of the concept of liberty was well known to the framers. 30 They used words which they knew had grown in meaning, and which are capable of further growth. This growth occurs in the continuing process of reasoned decisionmaking by the application of the Constitution to particular cases and controversies; it is not a "blank check to posterity." ' 31 29. Id. at 35 n.55. 30. Blackstone wrote that " [t] here is no transaction in the ancient part of our English history more interesting and important, than the rise and progress, the gradual mutation, and final establishment of the charters of liberties, emphatically stiled THE GREAT CHARTER (1974) .
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